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DO WE NEED LABOR COURTS?
GEORGE CAHILL
If other disputes can be determined by law, why not disagree-
ments as to wages? The regulation of wages by law has a historical
background. The wages of unskilled laborers were regulated in Eng-
land from 1349 to 1536 under the "Statute of Laborers," and later
under the "Statute of Elizabeth",1 which affected not only unskilled
workers but the greater part of the industry of that time. The Eng-
lish people "did not for centuries believe that wages determined by
free contract were necessarily just - That they believed in an ob-
jective standard of justice, a standard independent of the terms of
the wage agreement, is evident from their continued efforts to regulate
the remuneration of labor by law".2 This policy of regulation by
statute was not the only means used, but regulation was also effected
through the rules and customs of the gilds.3
In 1720 the English Parliament fixed a maximum wage scale for
journeyman tailors,4 and in 1750-51 the English courts required master
tailors to pay a certain minimum wage. In some cases the local
justices of the peace fixed wages pursuant to Act of Parliament.5
"It was assumed to be the business of Parliament and the law courts
to regulate the conditions of labor".6
The English Parliament in 1795, 1800 and in 1808 enacted various
minimum wage laws. It also enacted laws empowering courts to fix
wages.1 In 1812 the cotton weavers of Glasgow were unable to agree
with a committee of their employers on a reasonable standard of
wages and thereupon appealed to the Court of Sessions who con-
firmed the wage rates established by the justices as reasonable.
Thereupon the employers withdrew from the proceedings and refused
to comply with the decision of the justices. This precipitated a nation-
'wide strike which was broken up by the arrest of the strike leaders
for the crime of combination.8
1 Webb, "History of Trade Unionism," p. 42; Ryan, "A Living Wage," p. 23-26.
2 Ryan, op. cit., p. 25.
3 Op. cit., 26.
4 Webb, op. cit., p. 31.5 Op. cit., p. 50.
6 Op. cit., p. 65.
7 Webb, op. cit., p. 58.
8 Webb, op. cit., p. 58, 59.
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I
THE RIGHT TO WAGES IS A MORAL RIGHT
All men have a primary natural right "to subsist upon the bounty
of the earth",9 from which is derived the secondary right (for those
who work for wages) of a decent living. This includes sufficient
to raise, support and educate a family, with reasonable opportunity
for recreation and self improvement. In other words, wages, hours
and other conditions of employment is an objective ethical or moral
concept, and is not based upon free bargaining or contract which
latter may or may not be fair either to the employer or to the em-
ployee. The only way that a fair wage can be determined is either
by legislative act or by a labor court upon evidence submitted to it.
As legislatures cannot always be in session and as conditions affect-
ing wages change from time to time and as they differ in certain
kinds of work the determination of a labor court, in a particular
case, would seem to be the only practical and effective method of
fixing a fair wage.
The Australian labor court, which has satisfactorily settled numer-
ous labor disputes, speaking through its presiding Justice, stated that
the court adopted the principle0 "that each worker should have at
least his essential human needs satisfied, and that among the human
needs, there must be included, the needs of the family. Sobriety,
health, efficiency, the proper rearing of the young, morality, humanity
all depend greatly upon the family life and the family life cannot
be maintained without suitable economic conditions.
Pope Leo XIII in his famous encyclical on labor, Rerum Novarum,
formulated the doctrine that regardless of an agreement freely en-
tered into between the employer and the employee, the wage earner
was entitled as a matter of morals to a sufficient remuneration to
support him in reasonable frugal comfort. Professor Ryan in his book,
"A Living Wage," states that unlimited bargaining is not a solution
of disputes between employer and employee; that a just, an impartial,
fixing of wages is based on ethical principles; that bargaining between
employer and employee is comparatively new in the history of labor
relations."1
9 Ryan, op. cit., Chapter VII.
:029 Harv. Law Rev. 13-27 (1915).
21 "The ethical theory underlying the method of unlimited bargaining, namely,
that contracts made without force are necessarily fair, is, despite the prevailing
practice condemned by the majority of disinterested persons. This attitude of
mind is most clearly shown in the widespread conviction that the exorbitant
prices charged and the enormous profits obtained by some of the great trusts
are not only a menace to public welfare but positively unjust and dishonest.
Yet the contracts by which this result is brought about are free. Speaking of
the exorbitant profits made by a prominent corporation in the manufacture of
steel rails, a capitalist and ex-senator of the United States not long ago de-
clared, "If this is not robbery, I would like to find some stronger word to
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The encyclical, "Return Novarum," written in 1891, foreshadowed
the need of Labor Courts in these words; (translation) :
"Whenever the general interest of any particular class suffers
or is threatened with evils which can in no other way be met,
the public authority must step in to meet them. Now among
the interests of the public, as of private individuals are these;
that the peace and good order be maintained - that the sanctity
of justice be respected, and that no one should injure another
with impunity... If by a strike or other combination of work-
men, there should be imminent danger of disturbance of the
public peace... or if employers laid burdens upon the workmen
which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions, that
were repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally if
health were endangered by excessive labor, or by work unsuited
to sex or age - in these cases there would be no question
that, within certain limits, it would be right to call in the help
and authority of the law."
"It must be born in mind that the chief thing to be secured
is the safeguarding by legal enactment and policy, of private
property ... This great labor question cannot be solved except
by assuming as a principle that private ownership must be held
sacred and inviolable."
The encyclical, "Quadragesimo Anno," formulated in 1931 by
Pius XI, as a revised edition of "Rerum Novarumi" reiterated Leo's
postulates based as they were on the Gospel teaching. It declared it
the duty of the civil authority to administer justice among the warring
elements in the modern economy; to protect the weak from the
strong, and in general to secure the highest well being for the entire
body politic. That labor, due to the fact that the laborer is a human
being, cannot be bought and sold like any other commodity. That
it cannot be subject solely to free competition or economic supremacy.
The corollary to the foregoing is that impartial labor or industrial
courts can alone dispense justice, not only as between employer and
characteriez it." With this view practically the whole of the American people
would agree. Nevertheless, the purchasers of steel rails are neither deceived or
coerced; the transaction is free. Again the money shark who trades on the dis-
tress and ignorance of the poor by charging exorbitant rates of interest, gives
his victim the benefit of a free contract; yet he is restrained by the civil law
and condemned by the public conscience. Similarly with bargains where the
subject matter is human services. . . . men have always regarded the fixing
of wages as in some degree an ethical action ... the preponderance of human
opinin is decidedly against the method of unlimited bargaining. The belief that
the amount of remuneration given the laborer is entirely devoid of moral
aspects, in other words, that "there is no such thing as fair wages" has never
been held by any considerable section of any community. Either explicitly or
implicitly men have always been virtually unanimous in the conviction that the
standard for determining wages should be a moral standard. Although the
method of unlimited bargaining is the prevailing one, it is less than a century
in existence and was established through the mistaken efforts of economists
and legislators. Previously to that period it was frowned upon by the political,
religious, and moral forces of society." Ryan, op. cit., 35, 39.
19471
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employee, but also in the public interest. Such courts exist in Sweden
and in Great Britain and while their decrees in the latter country are
not binding they are generally accepted.
Human rights are superior to rights of property. Professor Ryan
has this to say :12
"The greatest of theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas, main-
tained that the man in extreme need who had no other re-
sources, was justified in supplying his necessities from the goods
of his neighbor, and that this would not, properly speaking, be
theft."
Those who are blessed with "superfluous goods" have a "general
duty of charity or beneficence" to help their less fortunate brothers.
"Superfluous goods are a trust to be administered for the benefit
of the needy". 1 3 The Apostle St. Paul says:
"Let your abundance supply their want." II Cor. VIII, 14. Pope
Leo XIII in his encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor" said:
"When one's necessities have been fairly supplied, and one's
position fairly considered, one is bound to give to the indigent
out of that which remains."
St. Thomas Aquinas in his, "Summa Theologica," says :14
"To give from one's superfluous goods is strictly com-
manded."
II
THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR COURTS
Settlement of labor disputes by court action is recommended by
Judge Higgins, President of the Australian Court of Conciliation,
and also Justice of the High Court of Australia. The Australian
Federal System is similar to ours, the residuary powers of government
being in the States. The Federal government was empowered to
legislate as to industrial disputes "extending beyond the limits of any
one state." A Court of Conciliation was established by statute and
where Conciliation was impracticable, arbitration was provided for,
and the court made an award which was binding on the parties. A
strike or lockout in disputes that came within the act was made an
offense. Conciliation was provided for with compulsory arbitration
in the background; this was substituted for the "barbarous processes
of strike and lockout. Reason is to displace force; the might of the
State is to enforce peace between industrial combatants; and all in
12 Ryan, "A Living Wage," p. 69-70; "Summa Theologica," 2a, 2ae. q. 86, a. 7.
13Ryan, id., 270, 271.14 2a, 2ae, q. 32, art. 6. Also St. Basil, "Are you not a despoiler since you have
made your own that which you have received to distribute ;" Migne, "Patro-
logia Graeca," vol. XXXI-col. 27.
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the interest of the public". 5 The Australian federal compulsory arbi-
tration act requires the organization or unionization of employees. An
individual formerly could not invoke the powers of the labor court,
although the court can intervene for the preservation of industrial
peace, even when its powers are not invoked by any union.", The
underlying thought is that the employer should not be harassed by
individual complaints but should deal only with his employees as an
organized responsible unit. A union must be "registered," and its
constitution and by-laws approved by the Arbitration Court 17
The Australian Labor Court fixes a minimum wage;1s the cost
of court proceedings are small, the chief expense being the securing
of witnesses. As to the effect of compulsory arbitration in Australia,
judge Higgins, writing in November 1915, stated that since the act
came into effect, while there were "numerous strikes in Australia as
elsewhere," there had been none in wage disputes coming under the
jurisdiction of the federal labor court. As to this court "its object
is industrial peace between those who do the work and those who
direct it".19
ITT
THE KANSAS EXPERIMENT
The only instance in this country of the settlement of labor dis-
putes by a labor or industrial court is the Kansas Act of 1920. The
proposed bill for the act was brought before the Kansas legislature
under determined opposition by organized labor as well as employers.
judge W. L. Higgins, advocating the proposed act before the House
in committee of the whole, in part said-2°
in eyery Anglo-Saxon country in the world, every
government (this is an Anglo-Saxon country because our laws
and institutions are founded upon the English common law),
every permanent addition to the body of the law, every enact-
ment which has become permanent and remained, has grown
out of some great public necessity. In Anglo-Saxon countries
the law springs from the common level of the general public.
In monarchical countries it comes the other way - from the
top down. In our country it comes from the bottom and springs
up, and every permanent law takes root in human necessity
as the tree takes root in the soil. Let me illustrate briefly.
Two hundred and fifty years ago Sir Matthew Hale, one of
the great judges of England, later lord chief justice, wrote a
paragraph concerning public use which has been said to be
the greatest expression of its kind that ever has been printed,
15'29 Harv. Law Rev. 13 (1915).
16 Op. cit., 13 and 23.
17 Minn. Law Rev., Vol. 30, Page 1-19.18 Judge Higgins in 29 Harv. Law Review 25 (1915).
'- 29 Harv. L.R. 13-27 (1915).
20 "The Party of the Third Part," Allen, pp. 84, 85, 87 and 88 (1922).
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and it was about as follows: He said that if the king himself
(mark the word "king") is the owner of a public wharf to which
all persons must come to unload their goods, even he cannot
make excessive charges for wharfage, cranage, and the like,
because the wharf, the crane, and the other loading facilities
are public utilities, and are no longer to be regarded as private
property. That was a long time ago. That has been the law in
every English speaking country of the world ever since. Never
has it been gainsaid. We have extended the principle - ex-
tended it in Kansa a good many years ago when we passed the
law creating the railroad board; extended it farther when we
created the Public Utilities Act, so that we have now not only
fixed the price which the public must pay for these things,
but we have compelled the continuance of the service, com-
pelled the railroads to run their trains - to run continuously;
haven't allowed a road to take off a freight train in order to
boost the price of freight; haven't allowed an elecrtic plant
to shut down its service - So in this bill, we are stepping
out a little bit farther, and we are saying that not only shall
the railroads be compelled to furnish service, not only shall
the electric-light company be compelled to furnish its service,
and the water company, and the telephone company, but be-
cause of the very necessities of the case the people must have
food, clothing and fuel. Therefore, we say to the concerns
which furnish these products, the bare necessities of life; "You
shall not cease operations and let the people go hungry. You
shall not cease operations and let the people freeze . . ."
"Now I am going a little farther, and say you have no
right, no moral right, to take away the laboring man's right to
strike, unless you give him a better remedy. You study that
over, all of you. You have no right to take away the labor-
ing man's only weapon unless you give him a better one. Why
I have lived in a community in which it was necessary to carry
a revolver. I didn't like it very well, and didn't stay there
very long, but it was necessary, and I carried one - because
the law didn't protect me. It was down in Mexico, where
they don't have any law of any kind. Now we have passed a
statute in which we make it a crime for a man to carry con-
cealed weapons. We have a right to do that as a state, because
we have surrounded every citizen by the greatest protection
that ever was known, the protection of Anglo-Saxon law,
guaranteeing Anglo-Saxon liberty and justice. Consequently
he doesn't need his weapon and we have a right to say to him,
"You can't have it." We have never given labor a weapon
of self-defense, so we have to let labor carry a gun - that is
the right to strike; and if you can't give labor a better weapon,
for God's sake don't take the only weapon it has away from it.
You are offering labor a weapon which makes the old weapon
unnecessary. You are offering it a legally constituted tribunal
composed of impartial judges, and all the machinery necessary
to give free and even handed justice, with power to enforce
against employers the duty of paying a fair wage, of granting
[Vol. 31
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fair hours of labor, and good moral, and healthful surround-
ings while they are engaged in that labor; and the bill says so
in that many words. And when you give labor that other
weapon, when you give it a court to which to go and surround
it by the protection of law, you have the same right to take
away the weapon of the strike as you have to make a law
preventing me from carrying a concealed weapon; you have
gone farther to insure labor a fair reward; you have gone
farther to insure to every laboring man the right and ability
to bring up his family, to educate his children, and to give
them good, moral, and educational surroundings, than any
state or nation has done since the founding of society."
William Allen White, representing the public, supporting the
proposed law, discussed before the Senate Committee the philosophy
of the proposed bill. He said.9
"As civilization grows, it grows more complex - Civilization
is the constant enlargement from the more simple form to the
more complicated form, and it will never return to the simpler
form. Today we are taking in Kansas, a step which must be
taken throughout the world. To affect with public use all
those interests which are concerned with productive industry,
we are in effect making them public utilities.
Every age, every century, and in these modern times every
decade, sees some business or interest formerly considered pri-
vate business or private interest set over in the public interest.
Two hundred years ago, when a gentleman had a quarrel with
another gentleman, it was supposed to be a private quarrel,
which should be settled under a private code called dueling,
but too many innocent bystanders got hurt and dueling was
stopped in the interest of the public. Time was when a quarrel
between a slave and his master was a private matter, and
the master had private rights over his slave. That was stopped.
The pirate's right was once a private right, but that right
was removed for the public good, and when labor and capital
engage in a brawl which threatens daily processes of civilization,
we are taking away the right to that brawl and saying the
quarrel must be settled in the public interest.
The public in establishing wages, will be interested, not
in labor as a commodity, but in labor as a citizen. The public
is interested in capital chiefly to see that capital gets justice;
that it has a fair return and a profit sufficiently large to en-
courage enterprise, which is our God-given gift - the gift
which distinguishes America from all the world; and by trust-
ing to the public - that is to say, trusting to the organized
forces of society in government - to adjudicate wages, capital
will find a just and equitable bureau or court or commission,
or what you will, and in ten years capital will regard this day
as the beginning of a new era in its organization. We are
not trying to throttle capital and labor in Kansas, but to emanci-
pate them from their own strangle-hold upon each other and
to establish an equitable and living relation between them."
21 Op. Cit., p. 89, 90.
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The Kansas Industrial Court Act, enacted in 1920, covered busi-
nesses "affected with a public interest" declared by the Act to include -
(1) the manufacture and preparation of food for human needs; (2)
manufacture of clothing for human wear; (3) production of any
substance in common use for fuel; (4) transportation of the fore-
going; (5) Public utilities and common carriers. The act empowered
an industrial court of three judges, either upon its own motion, or
upon complaint, to summon the parties before it, and hear any dis-
pute over wages or the terms of employment, and if it should find
the health or peace of the public imperiled by such dispute, to make
findings and fix wages and other terms for the conduct of the industry.
Appeal could be taken from its orders to the Supreme Court of
Kansas, which had power of review of such orders and if approved,
to enforce them.
The activities of the first eighteen months of the Kansas Labor
court were reported upon by its presiding judges in 1922.22 This
report showed that both labor and industry were satisfied. Of the
thirty-nine formal cases brought before the court and disposed of,
in only one case was an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of Kansas.
This was the famous Wolf Packing Company case23 which finally
landed in the Supreme Court of the United States. The latter Court
reversed the Supreme Court of Kansas, and declared the Kansas
Statute invalid in so far as it affected a private business as a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV
THE SUPREME COURT HURDLE
In view of the decision in the Wolf Packing Co. case 24 it has
been generally considered in this country that compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes, either by administrative board or by a labor court,
will be prohibited as a deprivation of "property and liberty of con-
22 Judge Huggins in "Labor Democracy" pages 102105 (1922):
"The Kansas Industrial Relations Act became operative Jan. 24, 1920. On Feb.
2, following the Court of Industrial Relations established by the Act was or-
ganized and began to function. From Feb. 2, 1920 to Aug. 1, 1921, 39 formal
industrial cases have been issued. Among the formal cases, there have been
three original investigations instituted by the court. The Court has considered
many informal matters relating to industrial conditions and contracts of em-
ployment. Labor on the whole has appeared to be fairly well satisfied with the
treatment in the Court of Industrial Relations. All of the orders and judg-
ments of the Court so far have been accepted by the employers and employees
alike with the exception of the last one. In that case, the Wolf Packing Com-
pany of Topeka, Kansas, has availed itself of the provisions of Section 12 of
the law and has taken the matter-to the Supreme Court of the State. Laborers
have in every case accepted the judgment of the Industrial Court although they
might have demanded a review by the Supreme Court without any expense to
themselves."
23 Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 67 L. ed.
1103 (1923).
24 Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
[Vol. 31
9 DO WE NEED LABOR COURTS?
tract" under the due process clause of either the Fourteenth or the
Fifth Amendment. The due process claude is the same in both amend-
ments and makes no mention of contract. Justice Holmes, in his
historic dissent in the Adkins case 5 in ,1923, which was followed as
the law by Chief Justice Hughes in the West Coast Hotel Company
case 28 in 1937, discussed "Liberty of Contract" as imported into the
Fifth Amendment as follows:
"But in the present instance the only objection that can be
urged is found within the vague contours of the 5th Amendment
prohibiting the depriving any person of liberty or property
without due process of law. To that I turn.
The earlier decisions upon the same words in the 14th
Amendment began within our memory and went no farther
than an unpretentious assertion of the liberty to follow the
ordinary callings. Later that innocuous generality was ex-
panded into the dogma. Liberty of Contract. Contract is not
specially mentioned in the text that we have to construe. It
is merely an example of doing what you want to do embodied
in the word "Liberty." But pretty much all law consists in
forbidding man to do some things that they want to do and
contract is no more exempt from law than other acts." (em-
phasis supplied)
Justice Miller, in 1878 in the Davidson case, deprecated the use
of the Fourteenth Amendment (adopted in 1868) as a catch-all for
dissatisfied litigants in the lower courts. Speaking for the Court he
said :7
"But while it (the 14th Amendment) has been a part of
the Constitution, as a restraint upon the power of the States
only a very few years, the docket of this Court is overcrowded
with cases in which we are asked to hold that the State Courts
and State Legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. There is here
abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception
of the scope of this provision as found in the 14th Amendment.
In fact, it would seem from the character of many of the cases
before us, and the arguments made in them, that the clause
under consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing
25 Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923). In the Adkins case
there was involved the constitutionality of an act of Congress fixing minimum
wages for women and children in the District of Columbia. The act provided
for a board of three members which would hold hearings and determine mini-
mum wages that employers could pay women and children as would be sufficient
for a decent living for their employees. The Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 de-
cision, held the act invalid as a violation of freedom of contract under the
due process clause of the 5th Amendment.
28 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). There was presented in
this case the constitutionality of the minimum wage law of the State of Wash-
ington for women. It was claimed that it violated freedom of contract under
the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Adkins case and held
the Washington statute valid.
27 Davidson v. New Orleans, 86 U.S. 103; 6 Otto 97-108, 24 L. ed. 616, 619 (1878).
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to the test of the decision of this Court the abstract opinions
of every unsuccessful litigant in a State Court of the justice
of the decision against him and of the merits of the legislation
on which such a decision may be founded."
Justice Holmes in 1930 in a dissent, concurred in by Justices
Brandeis and Stone, again stated a similar opinion. He said:2
"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety
that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the 14th Amend-
ment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional
rights of the States. As decisions now stand, I see hardly any
limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they
happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason
undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was in-
tended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or
moral beliefs in its prohibitions - we ought to remember
the caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the power
of the States, and should be slow to construe the clause in
the 14th Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide
but the Court's own discretion, the validity of whatever laws
the States may pass."
The Supreme Court in 1877 upheld the rights of the States to
regulate the rates and services of public utilities but with two Justices
dissenting. 9 However, beginning with 1890, almost any kind of State
regulatory o'r reform legislation was subjected to the narrow gauge
contract and property restrictions imported into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by judicial construction based upon an early nineteenth cen-
tury economy. 30
In 1936 the Supreme Court declared the New York minimum
wage law unconstitutional, 31 having held in the Adkins case 32 that
Congress was without power to enact such legislation. The New York
minimum wage law prohibited the employment of women in certain
lines of work for less wages than were commensurate with the work
done, and which would be sufficient to supply a minimum standard
for a reasonable healthful living. In other words, the "sweat-shop"
was to bed one away with.33 The Supreme Court held the New
York act invalid as an interference with "freedom of contract" under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Butler, speaking for the Court,
said;
"In making contracts of employment generally speaking, the
parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best
terms they can by private bargaining . . . The state is without
28 Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595, 74 L. ed. 1056, 1061 (6 to 3 decision)
(1930).
2 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
30 Jackson, "Struggle for Judicial Supremacy" (1941).
3' Morehead v. N.Y., 298 U.S. 587, 610, 618, 632 (5 to 4 decison) (1936).
32 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
33 Jackson, op. cit. 173-4 (1941).
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power by any form of legislation to prohibit, change, or modify
contracts between employers and adult women workers as
to the amount of wages to be paid."
Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting, said;
"I can find nothing in the Federal Constitution which denies
to the State the power to protect women from being exploited
by overreaching employers through the refusal of a fair wage
as defined in the New York statute and ascertained in a reason-
able manner by competent authority."
Justice Stone dissenting said;
There is grim irony in speaking of freedom of contract of
those who because of their economic necessities, give their
services for less than is needful to keep body and soul together.
But if this is freedom of contract, no one has ever denied that
it is a freedom which may be restrained notwithstanding the
14th Amendment by a statute passed in the public interest."
The Supreme Court is a restricting influence on the executive
and legislative branches of the government. It is naturally con-
servative and opposed to a liberal viewpoint.3 4 Its primary office
according to its ancient tradition, is to protect rights of property
as superior to human rights.3 5 Its interpretation of the Constitution
is that of a prior age. It is not tuned to present social or economic
needs. It is made up of lawyers, both as to the presentation of cases
as well as their decision. Lawyers are generally protectors of property
rights. The popular trend or liberal philosophy is most obviously
represented in dissenting opinions of courageous judges who are
willing to get away from the beaten path of ancient decisions gener-
ally based upon a social policy that has passed into history. In other
words, the dissenters are original thinkers; they are not slaves to
stare decisis but base their decisions on reason and on present
economic conditions.
The judicial department with life tenure generally belongs to a
prior generation and is a retarding influence upon any progressive
and untried governmental policy proposed by the elective branches
of the government. It is controlled by lawyers exclusively. It is not
responsive to the popular "will and is often uninformed as to popular
needs especially where human rights are involved.
Robert H. Jackson, later Justice,3 6 writing in 1940 condemned
the attitude of the conservatives on the Supreme Court in restricting
34 jackson, op. cit., Chpts. IX and X.
35As stated by judge VanOrsdel in the Adkins case in the lower Federal Court,
284 Fed. 613 (1922):
"It should be remembered that the three fundamental principles which
underlie government and for which government exists, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, the chief of these is property." (emphasis supplied).36 Justice was sworn in a member of the Supreme Court, Oct. 6, 1941.
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economic and social legislation both by Congress and the state legis-
latures under an all embracing construction of the due process clause
in the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The Court had gone
to unlimited extremes to invalidate state laws, enacted under the
police power for the welfare of the ordinary citizen. If it had per-
mitted the states, at an earlier time, to try out industrial courts,
compulsory arbitration, and other regulatory restrictions in the in-
terest of the public, we would have today a workable solution of the
labor problem now confronting Congress as well as the statesY. The
old Supreme Court conservative majority, champion of property
rights as opposed to human rights, was almost always in error in
its decisions on great national questions, as shown by the Dred Scot
case, the legal tender cases and the income tax decision, all of which
pronouncements were later repudiated by an enlightened and humane
public opinion. The same is true as to its restrictive policy on labor
legislation both state and national, now since the West Coast Hotel Co.
case 38 being gradually discarded.
Again we hear from the Supreme Court the voice of that great
philosopher, Justice Holmes, in 1921 :39
"There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of
the 14th Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its
words to prevent the making of social experiments, that an
important part of the community desires, in its insulated cham-
bers afforded by the several states, even though the experiments
may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose
judgment I most respect."
Compulsory settlement of labor disputes by an impartial labor
court is not in conflict with the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments,
as indicated in the reasoning of numerous decisions of the Supreme
Court.
The Adkins case held that a minimum wage law interfered with
liberty of contract. This was reversed in the West Coast Hotel Com-
pany case. In the case of Wilson v. New,4'O which upheld the validity
of the Adamson law, Chief Justice White, speaking for the Court,
said:
"The act which is before us was clearly within the legislative
power of Congress to adopt and that in substance and effect, it
amounted to an assertion of its authority, under the circum-
stances disclosed to compulsorily arbitrate the dispute between
the parties by establishing as to the subject matter of the dispute,
37 Jackson, op. cit., 68.38 West Coast Hotel Co., supra. (opinion by Chief Justice Hughes; 5 to 4 decision
-dissenting, Sutherland, Vandevanter, HMcReynolds and Butlery, 300 U.S.
379, 81 L. ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330 (1937).39 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344, 66 L. ed. 254, 267 (5 to 4 dec.) (1921).
40 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 331; 61 L. ed. 755 (5 to 4 decision) (1917).
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a legislative standard of wages operative and binding as a matter
of law upon the parties - a power none the less efficaciously
exerted because exercised by direct legislation instead of by
enactment of other appropriate means providing for the bring-
ing about of such result."
The passage of the Adamson Law was demanded by the four
American brotherhoods, and President Wilson at that time stated:
"Matters have come to a sudden crisis in this dispute and the
country has been caught unprovided with any practical means
of enforcing the principle of arbitration - A situation had to
be met whose elements and fixed conditions were indisputable.
The practical and patriotic course to pursue, it seemed to me,
was to secure immediate peace by acceding the one thing in the
demands of the men which would bring peace." (enphasis
supplied)
President Wilson at that time advocated compulsory arbitration, or
a court's settlement of labor disputes to be established by Congress
as to interstate commerce. He said:
"There is one thing we should do if we are true champions
of arbitration. We should make all awards and judgments by
record of a court of law, in order that their interpretation and
enforcement might lay, not with one of the parties in arbitra-
tion but with an impartial and authoratative tribunal. These
things I urge upon you, not in haste or merely as a means
of meeting the present emergency but as permanent and neces-
sary additions to the laws of the land, suggested by circum-
stances we hope never to see, but imperative as well as just,
if such emergencies are to be met in the future!' (emphasis
supplied) 4'
Justice McReynolds, dissenting in the case of Wilson v. New, 42 stated:
"But considering the doctrine now advanced by a majority of
the court is established, it follows of course that Congress has
power to fix a maximum as well as a minimum wage for train-
men; and to require compulsory arbitration of labor disputes,
which may seriously and directly jeojardize the movement of
interstate traffic; and take measures effectively to protect the
free flow of such commerce against any combination, whether
of operators, owners, or strangers." (emphasis supplied)
In the case of U. S. v. Darby,43 the Supreme Court established the
power of Congress to fix minimum wages and maximum hours in
the Fair Labor Standards Act. If Congress can fix wages and hours
by direct legislation, why not by means of a labor court?4 4
The only practical solution of the conflict between industry and
labor is the principle of the Kansas act. It has been applied in England
and has worked satisfactorily in Australia and New Zealand.
41 "The Party of the Third Part," p. 192.
42 243 U.S. 332, 389; 61 L. ed. 755, 791.
43 U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100; 85 L. ed. 609 (1941).44 Prof. Ross in 29 Va. Law Rev. 881.
1947]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In the Adkins case,45 a property-minded conservative Supreme
Court majority of five justices declared a minimum wage law for
women and children in the District of Columbia, a violation of free-
dom of contract as injected into the Fifth Amendment. Only 14
years later,47 the same Supreme Court, with a liberal majority of five
justices, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, held the minimum
wage law of Washington not invalidated by the freedom of contract
doctrine. In the Wolf Packing Company case,48 decided in 1923,
the Supreme Court held the Kansas act invalid under the theory of
the Adkins decision.
It would seem that under current economic conditions, and in
view of the futility of trying to settle wage disputes by free bargain-
ing, that the Constitution should be interpreted in the light of present
conditions. Chief Justice Taft, dissenting in the Adkins case, said:
"The boundary of the police power beyond which its exer-
cise becomes an invasion of the guaranty of liberty under the
5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, is not easy to
mark. Our Court has been laboriously engaged in pricking out
the line in successive cases."
In the West Coast Hotel Co. case, which squarely reversed the
Adkins case, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, said:
"The Supreme Court of Washington has upheld the mini-
mum wage statute of that State. It has decided that the statute
is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State -
The state court has refused to regard the decision in the Adkins
case as determinative - the ruling of the state court demands
on our part a reexamination of the Adkins case. The importance
of the question, in which many States having similar laws are
concerned, the close division by which the decision in the Adkins
case was reached, and the economic conditions which have super-
vened, and in the light of which the reasonableness of the exer-
cise of the protective power of the State must be considered,
make it not only appropriate, but we think imperative, that in
deciding the present case the subject should receive fresh con-
sideration." (emphasis supplied).
In Hammer v. Dagenhart the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional an act of Congress prohibiting the shipment in interstate com-
merce of products of child labor. In the Darby case,4 9 the validity
of the Fair Labor Standards Act was established. The constitutionality
of the Act was challenged under the Commerce clause and the Fifth
and the Tenth Amendments. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the
45 Adkins case, supra., 261 U.S. 525, 562.
46 Wolf Packing Co. case, supra., (1923).
4 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379; 81 L. ed. 703, (Washington
48247 U.S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1104 (June 3, 1918) (5 to 4 decision).
Minimum Wage case).
49 U.S.v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 85 L. ed. 609 (1941).
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Court, specially overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and held for a
unanimous court that Congress as well as the State Legislatures had
the power to fix minimum wages and maximum hours applicable to
men as well as women and children and that such regulations were
not objectionable to freedom of contract under the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Darby case established the power of Legislatures, both State
and Federal, to fix not only wages and hours of employment but
also conditions of employment. It necessarily follows that legislative
'acts could also establish Labor courts with power to determine dis-
putes between employer and employee.
V
THE PUBLIC INTEREST MUST BE SAFEGUARDED
The Attorney General of the United States, Tom C. Clark, in an
address before the Chicago Bar Association in June, 1946 said:
"We know that there is a national and international con-
spiracy to divide our people, to discredit our institutions, and
to bring about disrespect for our government - We know full
well what communism and facism practice - sometimes one
taking the cloak of the other. We know that in the Black Bible
of their faith they seek to capture the important offices in labor
unions to create strikes and dissentions, and to raise barriers
to the efforts of lawful authorities to maintain civil peace - I
am told that in the councils of many labor unions, wherein
deliberations are screened from the public, identical tactics,
staged with acute parliamentary skill, are used to discredit and
disrupt proceedings, in the hope that the communists, or the
facists or both - for I see no difference in them - may
achieve final power. Small groups of radicals, well coached
in a prearranged plan, are using party line methods in identical
activity, so that they can speak to the people as a whole, not
in open avowal of their aims but with the voice of the honest
workingman".5
Labor unions with a membership of over eleven million in the
United States collect large sums of money in dues, initiation fees,
fines and special assessments and are not required by law to make
an accounting to their membership or to the public for the collec-
tion or disbursement of these funds. They are generally unincorpo-
rated; only one state requires their incorporation. They are in no
way subject to legal supervision and have at times threatened to use
unlimited sums of money to defeat particular candidates for office,
and in one well-known instance the President of the United States.
They spend money for political purposes without the consent of their
5032 A.B.A.J. 453, 456 (1946).
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membership. They are not required to publish financial statements
of their collections and disbursements as the law requires for banks,
insurance companies, candidates for public office and political parties.
They take an active part in electing to public office both state and
federal officials and exercise a potent influence on legislative policy
through their official labor journals which make convenient media
for communist and facist propaganda. 51
The welfare of the general public, that great unorganized ma-
jority of the American people, demands regulation by law to pre-
vent or at least control in the interest of the public, the wave of
strikes and labor stoppages which so seriously reduce production and
and also to oppose or at least equalize the activities of organized
minorities and pressure groups, chief among which is unionized
labor. The recent reorganization act 2 passed by Congress requiring
51 Edward F. Albertsworth, Northwestern Univ. Law School, writing in the
American Bar Association Journal in February, 1942 (28 A.B.A.J. 106, 109)
has this to say: "Assuming union dues to average $2 weekly, plus initiation
fees and special assessments, collections from eleven million persons would be
approximately between one and two billion dollars annually. What happens to
these funds thus collected ?-there are but few unions who do present to their
membership regular and reliable stewardship of the moneys collected. There are
today in the United States as a general rule no laws compelling accounting by
union officials of the sums collected from their membership nor their expendi-
ture. Banks, insurance companies and even political parties publish their in-
comes and expenditures but not labor unions. The British law so requires and
goes further in providing that consent of the union dues payer to expenditure of
his dues for political purposes must be obtained. With the great growth of
unionism during the past decade in the United States, the question arises. Is
their legal responsibility commensurate with their growth? The State of Kan-
sas in 1920 attained national recognition when its legislature sought to affect
with a public interest certain types of business not theretofore regarded as
public business. But the United States Supreme Court in review of the legisla-
tion gradually made the Kansas Industrial Court Act a dead letter. However,
the formula 'affected with a public interest' is a flexible one and has since the
decisions in the Kansas case been amplified to various new situations. With a
new majority personnel upon the Supreme Court of the United States there is
sound justification for the belief that, as the American public may become con-
vinced of regulation of unions of workers bith in istinterest and that of the
union membership, the Court will sustain the reasonable statutory regulation of
labor unionism now impending." David Lawrence the noted columnist, writing
in August, 1946, said: "The mayor of the largest city in the United States an-
nounced to the country that the 'Communist party is leading the strike' 'of truck
drivers in New York and vicinity-a strike that caused untold losses to the
people of that metropolis. Coincidentally, this week the New York Times an-
nounced through Louis Stark, its principal correspondent on labor matters and
widely known for impartiality, that Communists who have infiltrated into three
major unions are forcing a test of strength. There are other unions in which
Communists play an important part. They are influential, for example, in the
Auto Workers union and in some of the unions engaged in shipping-all of
which have inflicted costly strikes on the United States. The American people
now are observing unions with substantial minorities which openly favor the
cause of Russia as against the United States. Before 1941, the Nazis operated
through the Bund and other organizations not only in this country but in
other countries in North and South America. The Communists are doing the
same thing by infiltrating in the labor movements both of the United States
and of other countries in this hemisphere."52The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; Public Laws 601; 2 U.S.C.A. sec.
241-256.
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paid lobbyists to register is a step in the right direction. The records
in Washington show that in March 1947, five hundred forty-four
lobbyists were registered under the act.
On the other hand industry is not without the "beam" in its eye.
As has been indicated, the laborer has a primary moral right to
a decent livelihood for himself and for his family, due to the fact
that he is a human being. We quote again from Judge Higgins ;53
"The imposition of a -minimum wage, a wage below which
an employer must not go in employing a worker of a given
character implies of course, an admission of the truth of the
doctrine of modern economists of all schools - that freedom
of contract is a misnomer as applied to the contract between
an employer and an ordinary individual employee. The strategic
position of the employer in a contest as to wages is much
stronger than that of the individual employee. 'The power of
the employer to withhold bread is a much more effective weapon
than the power of the employee to refuse to labor.' Low wages
are bad in the workers' eyes, but unemployment with starvation
in the background, is worse."
Formerly industry was a law unto itself. The laborer accepted
what wages he was offered or was obliged to starve. This was free
competition. Industry formed its monopolies, had its manufacturer's
and other associations, its lobbies in Washington and at the various
state capitals, and domineered ruthlessly over the wage earner. How-
ever since 1929 and 1930 labor has gained the ascendency, due to
labor unions, the National Labor Relations Act, and the friendly
"New Deal" administration. Now labor wields economic supremacy
with the same domineering attitude formerly exercised by the so
called masters of industry. Capital now howls to high heaven for
the sins of labor, forgetful of the sins it committed (when it was
able) against the laborer, including the employment of women and
children at starvation wages.
The numerous current clashes between capital and labor that
have rocked the nation, not only affect the parties directly involved,
but also the vast majority of our people, which is neither organized
labor or monopolized industry. Governor Allen, commenting on this
phase of the problem, has this to say:
"Are industrial relations a matter of private contract? Is
the industrial problem contained within the four corners of
a collective bargain? A contract is between the party of the
first part and the party of the second part. In the evolution of
civilization and its industrial implements, a third party has
come to the front, and the party of the third part is greater
than the parties of the first and second parts. That third
53 29 Harv. Law Rev. 13, 25 (1915).
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party is the public and that means all of us. Industrial rela-
tions have taken a new meaning in society. In fact the public
is becoming enmeshed in them to such an extent that the rela-
tions constitute a great public problem . ..The laboring man
must be given prompt and complete justice. He must be given
the government's guarantee of absolute protection in order that
his progress be sane and constructive.
But the same principles of justice which are extended to
his side of the quarrel must be extended also to the side of
the employers. It is the duty of the government to see to it
that the strife which has grown between them shall no longer
express itself in a form of warfare upon an innocent and help-
less public ... Roughly speaking, one tenth of the total popula-
tion is composed of the actual members of organized labor and
organized capital. For the sake of convenience, it may there-
fore be said that nine tenths of the population represent the
public".54
VI
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT Is NOT A SOLUTION
The National Labor Relations Act does not provide a workable
system for the settlement of disputes between labor and industry.
It provides that labor has a right of self-organization without being
influenced or coerced either directly or indirectly by industry so that
the parties may bargain on an equal footing. This is as far as the
act goes. They do not have to agree upon anything. What agree-
ment they make if any is entirely their own affair; the public has
nothing to say about it, even if as a consequence the price of com-
modities has been doubled. The situation is comparable to that of
two men meeting on a crowded street who get into an argument;
each throws rocks at the other; traffic is held up and congested; store
windows are broken and several women and children are trampled
upon; some persons are injured. The police arrive and referee the
fight; all business is stopped for the time being. Fnally the com-
batants and some spectators are taken to the hosptial, after con-
siderable damage to the gentlemen involved and to a number of inno-
cent bystanders. Any settlement is based purely on physical strength.
This is the old trial by battle with the rules provided by the National
Labor Relations Act, the fight being supervised by the National Labor
Relations Board.
From the foregoing, it abundantly appears that to expect labor
and industry to settle their own differences by mutual agreement,
as contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act, is about as
sensible as to expect opposing litigants to settle their own law suits
between themselves and to do away with law courts. There is little
54 "The Party of the Third Part," Henry J. Allen, Governor of Kansas; Harper
& Brothers (1923).
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doubt that in America today the underlying thought of the over-
whelming majority of our population, which is neither organized labor
or organized capital, is that the labor disputes should be determined
by an impartial judicial tribunal to effectively mete out justice to
both parties. All that the law now requires is that they bargain.
Chief Justice Hughes in the Jones and Laughlin case,55 which de-
termined the constitutionality of the Wagner Act (N.L.R.A.) said:
"The Act does not compel agreements between employers and the
employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever." The Court
further stated that the object of the act was to give employees "free
opportunity for negotiation" with their employers by representatives
of their own choosing without coercion from the employer. That
the employer has a right to select and discharge employees without
interference from the Act, subject, however, to this proviso: 5r
"The employer may not under cover of the right, intimidate
or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization
and representation, and on the other hand, the Board is not en-
titled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the
right of discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons
than such intimidation and coercion."
Where employees are discharged, the intent of the employer can
be determined by the National Labor Relations Board, and if there
is any evidence in support of the Boards findings that the dis-
charges were on account of union activities of such employees, the
employer is penalized by being required to reinstate the employees
and to reimburse them with such back pay as may be determined
by the Board. Chief Justice Hughes in the Jones & Laughlin case
by inference admitted that the act was "one-sided in its application,"
but stated that that was the "policy of Congress" as expressed in
the act and that the court was only concerned with the power of
Congress, not its policy. The National Labor Relations Board is
practically a Kangaroo Court. In the hearings before it, it is not
confined to orderly court procedure. The act says:5r
"In any such proceeding (hearings before the board) the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall
not be controlling." sec. 10(b).
The Board has a right to determine the secret intent of the em-
ployer and if there is any testimony to support its findings, such
55 N.R.L.A.B. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 45, 46.
561d.
57 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 160 (1940).
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findings are conclusive regardless of the weight of the testimony on
behalf of the employer. The act states;58
"The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by
evidence shall be conclusive." sec. 10(e). (emphasis supplied).
The National Labor Relations Board -is an administrative agency
with the powers of a court.59 Its members are not required to have
judicial qualifications. They need not be "learned in the law," or
even be lawyers. Their annual salary is $10,000; they cannot be re-
moved except for malfeasance. There is no appeal from their find-
ings of the facts, "if supported by evidence." The act does not say
"substantial evidence." The rules of evidence in an ordinary court
are not binding on the "examiner". In almost any case a decision
for either party would have some evidence to support it. The Board
might consist of political appointees whose decisions, protected by
the Act from review on the facts by a higher court, would play
into the hands of a well organized and powerful minority.
As above outlined, under the original setup, hearings before the
National Labor Relations Board (as well as before other federal
administrative agencies) denied to litigants procedural due process.
To remedy this situation the American Bar Association sponsored
the "Administrative Procedure Act" which became law June 11, 1946.
The act applies to over thirty-five different administrative boards and
executive agencies. The law is entitled: "An act to improve the ad-
ministration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure."
In short it provides for the fundamentals of ordinary court procedure
and review in hearings before administrative boards; that their find-
ings and decisions be based upon legal evidence and a fair hearing.
While the new law will probably secure an impartial hearing be-
fore the National Labor Relations Board "examiners", the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act itself does not repeal either expressly or by
5829 U.S.C.A.; 29 Stat 449 (1935) ;
In the case of N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941),
the court said: "The command of sec. 10(e) of the act that 'the findings of the
Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence' precludes an independent con-
sideration of the facts. Bearing this in mind we must ever guard against allow-
ing our views to be substituted for those of the agency which Congress created
to administer the act;"
In N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand Inc., 94 Fed. (2nd) 862, 873 (1938), the court
said; "the charges are that the examiner cut short cross-examination-himself
took an undue part in the examination-admitted incompetent and excluded
competent evidence. He did indeed admit much that would have been excluded
at common law, but the act specifically so provided. Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C.A.
sec. 160(b); no doubt that does not mean that mere rumor will serve to "sup-
port" a finding but hearsay may do so, at least if more is not conveniently avail-
able.... The underlying tone and style of the decision, may not have indeed
evinced that judicial detachment which is the surest guarantee of even justice.
... Our review does not extend to controverted questions of fact."
59 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 151 et. seq.
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implication the limitations of the Wagner act, which deny to the
appellate court a reconsideration of the facts and explicitly provide
that the ordinary rules of evidence shall not be controlling.
In Bridges v. Wixon"" the Supreme Court held that in adminis-
trative hearings there was "the obligation to preserve the essential
rules of evidence by which rights are asserted or defended." The
dissent in this case naively states :.'
"With increasing frequency this Court is called upon to apply
the rule, which it has followed for many years, in deportation
cases as well as in other reviews of administrative proceedings,
that when there is evidence more than a scintilla, and not un-
believable on its face, it is for the administrative officer to de-
termine its credibility and weight."
It would seem that according to the foregoing dissent adminis-
trative boards, prior to the adoption of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, were not bound to accord to the parties procedural due
process under the Fifth Amendment. This probably was the implied
assumption under which the Wagner Act was framed.
Under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the re-
viewing court may set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
that are arbitrary, capricious, or are an abuse of discretion; are
contrary to constitutional right; are without observance of procedure
required by law; unsupported by substantial evidence; or are un-
warranted by the evidence, "to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court." However, as stated above,
the Administrative Procedure Act does not repeal the provisions as
to evidence, procedure and review in agency hearings under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
While it is true, that the Jones & Laughlin case upheld the valid-
ity of the Wagner act, it was a.five to four decision. Three Circuit
Courts of Appeals, consisting of nine experienced judges, basing their
decisions on prior well-established principles laid down by the Supreme
Court, had previously declared the act unconstitutional.
VII
THE SOLUTION Is THE ARBITRATION OF AN ImPARTIAL lABOR COURT
Courts are often, and lawyers are most always, slaves to stare
decisions. The courts are prone to regard decisions of the Supreme
Court, following prior decisions based on an ancient economy, as
part of the Constitution. Recent decisions have been getting away
from this mode of construction and have endeavored to get back to
60 326 U.S. 135, 153, 89 L. ed. 2103 (1945).
61 Ibid., p. 178.
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the Constitution by interpreting it in the light of the public welfare
under present conditions. In the Graves v. New York case,-2 which
overruled a long line of former decisions and abolished the doctrine
of intergovernmental immunity from taxation of salaries of employees
of either the states or the federal government, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring, condemned the tendency to regard what is said
about the Constitution as part of the Constitution itself. He said that
the Constitution should be interpreted:
"Mindful of the necessary demands of continuity in civilized
society. A reversal of a long line of current decisions can be
justified only if rooted in the Constitution itself as an historic
document designed for a developing nation . . . In this Court
dissents have gradually become majority opinions, and even
before the present decision the rationale of the doctrine had
been undermined. The judicial history of this doctrine of im-
munity is a striking illustration of the occasional tendency to
encrust unwarranted interpretations upon the Constitution and
thereafter to consider merely what has been judicially said
about the Constitution, rather than to be primarily controlled
by a fair conception of the Constitution. Judicial exegesis
is unavoidable with reference to an organic act like our Con-
stitution, drawn in many particulars with purposed vagueness
so as to leave room for the unfolding future. But the ulti-
mate touchstone on constitutionality is the Constitution itself
and not what we have said about it." (emphasis supplied)
In support of the above statement Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred
to Chief Justice Taney's statement in the Passenger cases :63
"I am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law
of this Court that its opinion upon the construction of the
Constitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed
to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority
should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reason-
ing by which it is supported."
The Supreme Court as now constituted is inclined to get back to a
rationalized interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed
by Mr. Justice Miller in 1878 in the Davidson case above referred to.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court in Everson v. Board of
Education, decided February 10, 1947, says:
"Changing local conditions create new local problems which
may lead a state's people to believe that laws authorizing new
types of public services are necessary to promote the general
well being of the people. The Fourteenth Amendment did not
strip the states of their power to meet problems previously
left to individual solution."
62306 U.S. 466, 491-2 (1939).
63 7 (How.) 283, 470, 12 L. ed. 702, 780.
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The principle of compulsory arbitration as embodied in the Kan-
sas act is within the scope of the police power of the States. The
decision in the Wolf Packing Company case would today probably
be out of tune with present economic thought in view of recent ag-
gression by organized labor which has seriously disturbed and affected
the entire nation. With a Supreme Court composed of liberal Justices
such as were Justices Miller, Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, Cardozo,
and Stone, settlement of labor disputes by court judgment would
probably be today declared to be within the police power and not
prohibited by the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments. Accounting
for the change in constitutional exegesis by our present Supreme
Court, Dr. Carl B. Swisher of John Hopkins University says:
"... because of the fact that for a period of years the old
Court failed to perform properly the function of steady adapta-
tion of constitutional law to the needs of the people, the new
Court finds it necessary to make what appears to be a sharp
break with the line of constitutional reasoning in the imme-
diate past in order to bring constitutional interpretation into
harmony with the public welfare which the constitution was
framed to promote. Having made that necessary break, the
task of the Court will be and, indeed already is, that of re-
establishing lines of continuity with the more distant past in
order to guide current constitutional development in terms of
the essential principles and ideals of our constitutional system.
Intermingled, therefore, with an unprecedented number of
frank reversals of past decisions have been efforts on the part
of the Court to get "back to the Constitution" - Where labor
legislation has been involved, the present Court, unlike its
predecessor of some two decades earlier, has not merely recog-
nized the existence of constitutional power of regulation on
the basis of the commerce clause but has inclined to interpret
broadly the regulatory power which Congress through various
labor statutes has confered upon administrators - Again in
connection with the exercise of both state and federal power,
the Supreme Court seems quietly to have devitalized the due
process clauses so far as what is known as substantive due
process is concerned. That barrier to governmental interference
with the rights of property elusive of definition though it was,
had stood squarely in the way of recognition of the changes
in the character of private property which the changes in the
essential character of our economy were forcing upon us.
In the hands of Justice Sutherland and others who had accepted
his point of view, it was a potent weapon. His successors re-
garding it as an overused weapon for the achievement of unde-
sirable ends, seem to have thrown it into the discard. These
and other constitutional changes which have taken place in
recent years, do not mean that the Supreme Court has aban-
doned its duty of appraising governmental action in terms
of constitutionality. It means, rather, that the Court is at-
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tempting to reconsolidate constitutional interpretation along
lines which are tenable in terms of current conception of the
public welfare" 24
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Wolf Packing Co.
case, declaring the Kansas act invalid, appears to have effectively
discouraged a program either by the states or the federal govern-
ment to have labor disputes settled by court judgment. There is
also the further factor of the definite opposition of organized labor
to compulsory arbitration in any form.
A recent proponent of labor courts is United States Senator Homer
Ferguson of Michigan,"5 a former state circuit judge in Detroit. His
argument is that management-labor, as well as jurisdictional disputes,
are basically the same as disputes between ordinary individuals, which
are every day determined and disposed of by the courts. He pro-
poses a system of labor courts, in disputes affecting interstate com-
merce, similar to our present federal district and circuit courts.
It would seem that all that would be necessary, would be to enlarge
the jurisdiction of our existing federal courts as well as the oppro-
priate state courts under the principle of the Kansas Industrial Act
heretofore discussed, so that labor and capital would be amenable to
the same courts as other trusts and combinations with similar burdens
and obligations.
The proposed plan of Senator Ferguson would be to prohibit
strikes in certain basic industries engaged in interstate commerce.
If a contract could not be agreed upon, the matter would be-decided
by the labor court after a hearing and the court's decision would be
final. The basic industries listed are: basic steel, coal, oil, gas (when
crossing state lines), all maritime shipping, railroads, electric power,
telephone and telegraph. The foregoing plan has now been offered
to Congress (in March 1947), sponsored by Senator Ferguson and
by Senator Smith of New Jersey, for special federal courts to handle
interstate labor cases. There would be eleven such courts to hear
disputes arising out of labor contracts, the national labor relations
act, the fair labor standards act, and the railway labor act. The bill
provides a means of enforcing existing labor contracts, which en-
forcement is now left to a strike. It provides for suability of unions,
without making the decision enforceable against individual members.
To allow for quick action, which is essential in most cases, pre-
trial conferences in the nature of mediation are authorized, and ap-
peals are given precedence in United States courts of appeal. Only
two of the three judges in each court would be lawyers. The third
64 "The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States," C. B. Swischer,
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judge will be a layman qualified in labor relations, involving a recog-
nition that labor problems are not strictly legal .
In support of the labor court act introduced in the Senate, Judg
Ferguson stated; Congressional Record March 19, 1947):
"When labor disputes which affect the public interest oc-
cur and are not settled, our citizens have reason to ask what has
become of our system of government under law.
Why are labor-management disputes any different from
landlord-tenant disputes except that the issues are bigger, more
people are involved, and the economic security of the Nation
is endangered?
Basically they are the same. The difference is in the han-
dling of the issues. Industrial disputes are still settled on the
basis of economic power. Which side can outstrangle the other
in a showdown? And nowadays these strangle holds cover
such wide areas that the public's neck is usually included . ..
Labor-industrial disputes should come within the jurisdic-
tion of a court established to handle them. The machinery to
provide the legal discipline of a civilized society must be de-
signed as nearly as humanly possible to carry out two basic
principles; first, that we are a government of law and not of
men; and second, that there must be equal justice under law.
Throughout our history, in all other fields of endeavor we
have discovered that the machinery best suited to settle dis-
putes and arrive at just decisions is the courts. Yet in labor-
industrial relations, we still cling to the principle that economic
and political pressure should govern. We create boards, com-
missions, or bureaus, and place on them special pleaders, or in-
structed partisan jurors, who act as prosecutors, judges, andjuries, and the people wonder why the system does not work.
This method would not be successful in any other field of
endeavor and it will not work in labor-management relations.
To me the appealing thing about a court system is that
it is simple, clearcut, understandable, fair, and the least po-
litical of our institutions. It is neither anti-labor or anti-
management, but rather is pro-everybody. Our courts have
long been admired as symbols of impartial justice, and I be-
lieve that the labor-relations courts would soon likewise be-
come such symbols."
Senator Smith of New Jersey, the other proponent of the labor
courts bill, had this to say in the Senate (Congressional Record;
March 19, 1947):
"As a member of the Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, I am working with my colleagues on that committee on
measures to correct current abuses in the labor situation, to
improve the conciliation and mediation machinery, and to in-
sure individual workers protection against exploitation both
by unfair employers and by power-obsessed labor unions.
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But beyond these corrective measures which are called
for at the moment I have all along had the feeling that we
have been remiss in getting at the very heart of this matter.
We have permitted remedies for labor disputes to drift along
while those labor disputes threaten the very peace of our so-
ciety. We have permitted labor-management disputes to come
to a dead end and to be settled by the rule of force.
We have tried to equalize the weight of the "brass knuckles"
in the contest and have then told the parties to "slug it out."
We have not made a statesmanlike effort to find out what is
right and just, but we have rather left the matter to the de-
termination between the parties of who is the strongest in a
knock-down, dragout struggle.
We have not adequately set our minds to the problem of
creating tribunals that will have the confidence of the contend-
ing parties and to which they can go to seek justice.
My colleague and I are now studying the whole question
of national paralysis cases, in which the interest of the public
must be paramount . ..We do believe that we may be able
to find a special procedure for those cases in which the health
and safety of the public are affected and in which it will be
necessary for the Government, preferably through the courts,
to act in order to maintain the status quo and continue produc-
tion pending an equitable adjustment of the disputes.
Mr. President, I am convinced that this bill is an important
contribution to the ultimate solution of labor-management diffi-
culties. I am in no way minimizing my insistence on the prin-
ciple that voluntary collective bargaining between the parties
must always be the first bulwark of labor peace, and that medi-
ation and conciliation must be completely explored before we
even approach the normal legal procedures."
The current popular demand for laws prohibiting strikes by public
employees calls for a tribunal to equitably and authoritatively settle
their grievances. We cannot take away the right to strike without
providing a better remedy. This remedy is a system of impartial
labor courts whose decisions would be subject to review the same
as in an ordinary lawsuit.
Charles P. Taft, president of the Federal Council of Churches,
proposes compulsory arbitration of strikes that affect the public in-
terest. Mr. Taft is a brother of Senator Taft, chairman of the Senate
Labor Committee, and he is labor relations counsel to the Monsanto
Chemical Company. Ludwig Teller, prominent New York lawyer,
an authority on labor relations, who has written"8 on the subject,
proposes a special labor court, free from political interference, with
jurisdiction limited to disputes affecting the public interest. Lee H.
Hill, publisher of "The Electrical World," approves compulsory ar-
bitration.
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As to the feasibility of a labor court, we quote from Judge Hug-
gins, the presiding officer of the Kansas Industrial Court; 6
"The Anglo-Saxon people in general accept without question
the authority and jurisdiction of their courts to adjudicate all
matters affecting the life, the liberty and the property of the
citizen. If a man's right to life is justiciable, if his liberty
which to the Anglo-Saxon is dearer than life itself, can be
taken away from him by the judgment of a court, surely
disputes as to wages, hours of labor and working conditions
are also subject to the jurisdiction of courts. A man who has
no faith in the courts has no place in a government of demo-
cratic institutions."
We conclude with the words of Governor Allen ;s8
"Strikes, lockouts, and other oppressive caveman measures
can no longer be considered mere private disputes under our
finely organized society. The world is getting too crowded and
its activities are becoming too scientific. Watches cannot be
repaired with monkey wrenches and crowbars. There is no
valid reason why industrial disputes should not be settled by
the government of the people than there is a reason for set-
tling debts by the use of fists and clubs. There is no valid
reason why the majority should submit to tremendous hard-
ship because of quarrels between members of a minority, when
such quarrels can be settled justly by the majority through law.
Courts are not perfect, but they stand between savagery and
civilization. If criminal and civil courts can be trusted, indus-
trial courts can be trusted. 'Let the safety of the public be
the supreme law'."
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